CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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REPORT USSR (Moscow Oblast) COUNTRY 14 February 1955 DATE DISTR. Shortage of Food and Consumer Goods SUBJECT in the Moscow Area NO. OF PAGES CA COUNTRY STEMBERY REASONS
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TATES, LE PERSONS THE BORDERS 25X1 REQUIREMENT NO. DATE OF INFO. REFERENCE This is UNEVALUATED PLACE ACQUIRED F THE UM. 20 STATES, WITHOUT THE EXPRESS PERMISSION OF THE RELEASING OFFICE. Information

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(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

1.	100 km from Moscow were rather depressed by the adverse economic conditions. The queues which formed in front of the bakeries were indicative of the	25X1 25X1
	Velikiye Luki (N 56-20, E 30-32),	
L	that similar conditions existed in that area and that the local population there	·е
	sometimes had to stand in bread lines for more than six hours.	25 X 1
	Common and the Common and Common	
2.	Numerous rumors concerning the cause of the bread shortage were current among the inhabitants. One of the rumors attributed the shortage to a very severe drought in several areas of the Soviet Union. Another rumor claimed that the increased military preparation and the stockpiling of grain by the government were the cause of the shortage. This last rumor was particularly current at the time of the Soviet announcement that US aircraft had violated the Soviet border in the Far East. Other rumors of a local nature blamed the shortage of bread on the poor organization of the bakeries in the total contents of the shortage of t	:
3.	Bread was not the only food item in short supply, but its scarcity was the most dramatic of the shortages. Although fresh meat was available, there were practically no meat products such as canned meat, sausages, and ham. The suppl of fats, including butter, was only occasionally available. Potatoes and other vegetables were comparatively easy to obtain.	Ly
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	Butter 30 to 35 rubles per kilogram	25X1
	Fresh meat (average cut) 16 to 20 rubles per kilogram	20/(1

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2 to 2.50 rubles per liter

STATE	х	ARMY	х	NAVY	х	AIR	х	FB1	AEC	<u>. </u>	 \perp

1.10 rubles each

(NOTE: Washington distribution indicated by "X": Field distribution by "#".)

Milk

Eggs

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	-2-	
4.	the prices on consumer goods were still very high. All textiles were always in short supply, and cloth of better quality was either unavailable or prohibitively priced for the average income. While these shortages of consumer goods existed in the small towns and rural centers in the Moscow area, practically anything could be purchased in the city of Moscow Even in Moscow, however, lines could be seen during the morning in front of government department stores; most of the people in these lines were waiting to purchase cheap textiles and other consumer goods.	25X1 •
5.	Although the local inhabitants were rather dispirited because of the various shortages, there was no evidence of serious unrest or any pronounced or open criticism of the agricultural policies of the Soviet Government.	25 X 1
	the people were far from satisfied with the promises of the Soviet authorities to increase the supply of food and consumer goods.	25 X 1
ó.	the population seemed to fear a new war and reacted with panic to any rumors of war.	25 X 1
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